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Summary   
 
The present study aims to identify certain social dividing lines, fractures and motivations that 
accelerated the rise in political murders and everyday violence after the Ilinden Uprising. The 
contribution of foreign intervention (including both the attempts of the great powers to 
settle the question and the propagandistic activity of neighboring small states) and local 
traditions (customs) to the nature and extent of violence are also investigated. The authors 
will also consider the shift in the support policy of neighboring small states from 
construction to destruction—including the issues of economic benefit and local acceptance 
at a time when selection of an identity no longer entailed only advantages, but imposed 
threats as well. During this period the boundaries between the various types of violent 
action triggered either by religious and school conflict or customs gradually faded, while 
Chetas became highly organized and self-subsistent through cultivation and smuggling of 
opium and tobacco and expropriation of state and private property. In order to trace the 
territorial and cultural patterns of violence as well as specific and general motives, the 
authors conducted a statistical analysis of quantitative data regarding victims and 
perpetrators. 
The study is based on the comparison of Austrian and Bulgarian archival sources in order to 
check the reliability of data. The study area—the Sanjak of Skopje in Kosovo—is suitable for 
examining problems related to the birth of modern nations: the ethnic and religious diversity 
of this sanjak makes it possible to investigate both the tensions that existed within and 
between the Eastern Orthodox and Muslim religious communities as well as the impact of 
small states with territorial pretensions on this region.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the 1878 Great Eastern Crisis, the remainder of the Balkan Peninsula had 
irreversibly become a frontier zone1 of the Ottoman Empire, a territory in which the 
collapsing central government was in direct contact with the rival great powers and the 
dynamically modernizing nation states nurturing expansive ambitions. This new situation 
sparked violence on the Ottoman side of the border, aggression that authorities either failed 
or did not even attempt to stop. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, 
Ottoman central power almost totally collapsed in the Kosovo Vilayet, leaving a vacuum for 
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 The term is used here in the Turnerian sense. 
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the propagandistic activity of small states. This manifested itself in the competition for souls, 
schools and religious posts between Serbians and Bulgarians proclaiming nationalistic views 
and aspirations abroad (a revival of ethnic mapping) and in the establishment of the 
revolutionary Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in 1893. This initial 
phase of the Macedonian question culminated in an attempt to relieve the oppressed 
peasantry in the course of the Ilinden Uprising in 1903 with the active contribution of 15,000 
guerillas and the local population.2 The subsequent plundering of 100 villages committed 
mainly by irregular Ottoman forces finally elicited the intervention of Great Powers to secure 
peace in the European Ottoman provinces. The suppression of the Ilinden Uprising and the 
cooperation of Macedonian nations provided a warning to Greece as well, prompting the 
vigorous awakening Greek propaganda.  
The present study3 focuses on the period after the Ilinden Uprising until the outbreak 
of the Balkan Wars, and aims to identify certain social dividing lines, fractures and 
motivations that accelerated the escalation of everyday violence. The authors will also 
investigate territorial and cultural patterns of violence, specific and general motives as well 
as the contribution of foreign intervention (including both the attempts of the Great Powers 
to settle the question and the propagandistic activity of neighboring small states) and local 
tradition (customs) to the nature and extent of violence. The authors have also examined 
changes in the support policy of neighboring small states, including the issues of economic 
benefit and local acceptance at a time when the selection of an identity no longer entailed 
only advantages, but imposed threats as well.  
The location to be investigated is the ethnically mixed Sanjak of Skopje in Kosovo 
Vilayet (organized in 1875–78) between the years 1903 and 1912 with a view toward the 
neighboring territories in order to assess the specific or general character of the evaluated 
events. The study area is suitable for analyzing problems related to the birth of modern 
nations: due to the ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the Sanjak of Skopje, tensions 
within and between its Eastern Orthodox and Muslim religious communities can be easily 
identified and demonstrated (Map 1, Table 1). Moreover, the sanjak was located close to the 
borders of small states with territorial pretensions toward this administrative unit of the 
Ottoman Empire, thereby adding an extra ingredient to the boiling pot.  
In using the expression “everyday violence,” the authors refer to those acts of 
violence which took place among the civil population on a daily basis and were not 
connected to the law-enforcement activity of the authorities (military reprisals, border 
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 The second phase is the intervention of the Great Powers in 1903–1908, the third is the revival of violence 
after the failure of these Powers to settle the questions. 
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 Research in the Austrian State Archives was conducted within the framework of the project "Politics and 
Society in Late Ottoman Kosovo. An Edition of Austro-Hungarian Consular Reports from Kosovo, 1870–1913" 
funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (Projekt Nr. P 21477-G18; project leader: Prof. Oliver Jens Schmitt; 
main researcher: Eva Anne Frantz; part time co-worker in 2010–11 (one month each); Krisztián Csaplár-
Degovics, part time co-worker (2013-); and Daniela Javorić. We would like to express our gratitude to Eva Anne 
Frantz for sharing the results of her research and her unpublished Ph.D. dissertation with us. The elaboration of 
this paper has been funded by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.  
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clashes, etc.).4 The theory of Georg Elwert provided an important methodological basis for 
the present work. He stresses that the weakening of the state creates a market and demand 
for violence in society (Gewaltmärkte), which is operated by communities organized for 
trading in violence and coercive measures as commodities (Gewaltgemeinschaften).  These 
Gewaltgemeinschaften [vendors] are formed primarily for economic reasons, though 
economic factors are also abundant on the demand side as well (economic rivalry between 
groups over scarce resources usually appears under the guise of ideological conflict and in 
the form of prejudice against “the other”). These groups, which gradually take control over 
the monopoly over the use of force from the state, have their own dynamics, including 
operating conditions and laws.5   
This phenomenon was examined primarily by sociologists and historians through case 
studies, concentrating on the reasons for violence and the formation of communities trading 
in violence.  However, the internal cohesion and integrative power of these structures, as 
well as their regulative functions and social spheres of action are considered to be under-
investigated. The uniqueness of this study is that it approaches the problem from economic 
aspects as well, stressing that special economic conditions triggered and accelerated the 
escalation, ethnicization and nationalization of violence in Macedonia. The authors would 
also like to draw attention to the practice (Gewaltpraxis) and yearly cycle of violence. 
Beyond the social life and background of Gewaltgemeinschaften, the victims of violence can 
also be examined at different levels.6 
This investigation utilizes a special type of source—the observations of Austrian 
consuls regarding everyday violence in comparison with contemporary Bulgarian consular 
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 The methodological approach and idea of this study to focus on everyday violence in the Sanjak of Skopje 
stems from Eva Anne Frantz, “Gewalt als Faktor der Desintegration im Osmanischen Reich - Formen von 
Alltagsgewalt im südwestlichen Kosovo in den Jahren 1870–1880 im Spiegel österreichisch-ungarischer 
Konsulatsberichte,” Südost-Forschungen 68 (2009): 184–204, esp. 184–187. Different forms of coexistance 
including violence in the Vilayet of Kosovo is also the topic of Eva Anne Frantz, “Muslime und Christen im 
spätosmanischen Kosovo: Lebenswelten und soziale Kommunikation in den Anfängen eines ethnopolitischen 
Konflikts, 1870–1913” (PhD-diss., University of Vienna, 2014). With regard to this question see also Eva Anne 
Frantz, “Religiös geprägte Lebenswelten im spätosmanischen Kosovo - Zur Bedeutung von religiösen 
Zugehörigkeiten, Eigen- und Fremdwahrnehmungen und Formen des Zusammenlebens bei albanischsprachigen 
Muslimen und Katholiken,” in Religion und Kultur im albanischsprachigen Südosteuropa, ed. Jens Oliver Schmitt 
(Wien: Lang, 2010), 127–150; and Eva Anne Frantz, “Violence and its Impact on Loyalty and Identity Formation 
in Late Ottoman Kosovo: Muslims and Christians in a Period of Reform and Transformation,” Journal of Muslim 
Minority Affairs 29, no. 4 (2009): 455–468. A German research group investigating the comparative historical 
and sociological interpretations of the role of communities based on trading in violence also served as an 
inspiration to the authors. The logic and terminology of the present study are based on the questions, aspects 
investigated and frameworks defined by Forschergruppe “Gewaltgemeinschaften”: Finanzierungsantrag und 
Forschungsprogramm 1. Juli 2009 bis 30. Juni 2012. November, 2008, Justus-Liebig-Universität-Giessen. 15–39.  
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 Georg Elwert, “Gewaltmärkte, Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalitat der Gewalt,” in Soziologie der Gewalt. 
Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, ed. Trutz, von Trotha (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), 86–101. 
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 Winfried Speitkamp, “Einführung,” in Gewaltgemeinschaften. Von der Spätantike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, ed. 
Winfried Speitkamp (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2013), 8–12. and Grandits, Hannes, Nathalie Clayer and Robert 
Pichler, “Introduction,” in Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and 
Nation-Building, eds. Hannes Grandits et al. (London: Tauris, 2011), 3–5.  
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reports. From a methodological point of view, a combination of Austrian and Bulgarian 
archival sources (a comparison of data obtained from independent observers and 
participants in events) can be used in order to avoid partiality, since even the different 
terminology in Austrian and Bulgarian documents reflects differences in interpretation of the 
events.7 The re-interpretation of some sources using a comparative approach would also be 
worthwhile. 
The limits of this study do not allow us to examine the origin of all fault lines and 
interactions: the authors therefore focus on the tensions between Muslims and Christians 
and the antagonism between Patriarchists and Exarchists.8 This chapter applies a statistical 
analysis of quantitative data regarding victims and perpetrators, tracing patterns, 
differences and general features. Analysis of selected individual case studies and the role of 
economic background will be published elsewhere.  
 
Table 1. Ethnic composition in the kazas of the Sanjak of Skopje in 1903 based on Austrian consular 
reports
9
 
Nationality  
Kaza 
Total Skopje Kumanovo Kriva Palanka  Kratovo Kočani 
Maleš 
Osmanie Radovište 
Štip 
(Ištib) 
Veles 
(Köprülü) 
Alba
nian Muslim 21,387 5,595 - - 7,800 - - - 1,500 
36,282 
(10%) 
Slav 
Exarchist 
(Bulgarian) 25,921 23,710 22,141 17,391 16,524 16,536 7,622 19,472 29,394 
178,711 
(50%) 
Patriarchist 4,406 8,358 108 954 1,090 288 - - 4,130 19,334 (5,5%) 
Muslim 
(Pomak) 5,600  - - - - 9,234  - - 5,242  
20,076 
(5,5%) 
Aromun 360 120 - 102 1,680  - - 900 3,162 (1%) 
Ottoman (Muslim) 9,949 6,765 1,929 3,815 11,600 425 10,464 25,764 12,512 83,223 (23%) 
Gypsies 2,404 1,008 336 336 712 485 390 378 664 6,713 (2%) 
Total 72,789 45,784 24,514 22,604 39,406 26,968 18,476 46,094 54 357 350,992 
Minorities such as Greeks and Jews that composed under one percent of the 
population are omitted. 
 
However, prior to the discussion of the social conflicts, it is necessary to make some general 
remarks in order to place the subject of our investigation in its historical (and 
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 It is important to note that the word “Bulgarian” is not equivalent to “Exarchist” in Austrian documents. 
Österreichische Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv (hereinafter ÖHHStA PA), VII/Fasz.434, 
Rappaport to Pallavicini, March 21, 1907., No.330, Beilage No.26, 5. See also the Kral consul’s map from 1903 in 
Nachlass Szapáry, ÖHHStA. Cited also by Толева,Тeодора. Виянието на Австро-Унгария за създаването на 
албанска нация, 1896-1906 (Sofia: Ciela, 2012), 540–544 (maps). By contrast, in the reports of the Bulgarian 
consul in Skopje, the term “Bulgarian” is synonymous with Exarchist. The word “Bulgarian” instead of 
“Exarchist” often occurs even in Exarchist ecclesiastical documents. See: Централен Държавен Архив, (Sofia, 
hereafter ЦДА), ф. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 31. In Bitola, for example, “Bulgarian school,” “Bulgarian church” are 
used. There were even Patriarchist Bulgarian villages according to Bulgarian sources (some of them were 
converted as a result of Serbian propaganda, though some were not affected). 
8
 The debate between Muslim communities of different origin and identity is not investigated here. 
9
 ÖHHStA 19. Nachlässe, Nachlaß August Kral, Kt.2, “Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und Religions-
Verhältnisse im Vilajet Kossovo (1903)”. 
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historiographical) context. In this article, the authors aimed to investigate whether analysis 
in earlier scholarly works regarding the main fault lines or the nature and forms of violence 
can be considered realistic and if this analysis can be validated using a larger database and 
numerous concrete examples or whether it should be revised.  
First general remark. As a consequence of the Tanzimat reforms, the differences 
between Muslims and Christians had been gradually diminishing, which deeply frustrated 
the Muslim community that was in the process of losing its privileges. However, economic 
inequality did not decrease as the landlords were mainly Muslims, which frustrated the 
Christians, who remained economically subjugated to the landlords (half of Macedonian land 
was in large estates called chiflik, while one-third was in waqf [Islamic land endowment] and 
only the remaining one-sixth was in the hand of freeholders in 1910).10 And since not all 
Muslims were rich, the abolition of their privileged position eliminated the last factor that 
differentiated them from the Christian rayah. These Muslim inhabitants of the central 
Balkans formed one of the most conservative religious groups in the empire, refusing to live 
within the framework of a modern state and harboring no desire to be treated equally to 
Christians. Therefore the reforms satisfied neither Muslims nor Christians, nor did they 
reinforce trust towards the viability of the state. The reforms had brought about 
confrontation between the Muslims and the central government, but the true victim of their 
anger and frustration was the local Christians, whom the state failed to protect. After 1878 
the situation deteriorated further when 40,000 Muslim refugees from Bosnia and the Sanjak 
of Niš arrived to Kosovo Vilayet (constituting one-third of the population in Priština, a 
quarter of the population in both Vučitrn and Gilan and ten percent of the population of 
Skopje).11 At the same time, vengeful neighboring small states were established. These 
muhajir families had lost everything they had during the war and the Ottoman government 
declined to provide them with support. Fleeing from the Austro-Hungarian occupation or 
from the Serbian army, the absence of state support and the pressing need to provide for 
their families prompted these refugees to take desperate measures. They expelled 
thousands of the local Slavic peasant families, mainly from eastern Kosovo, which then fled 
to Serbia (Mala Seoba). The Muslim refugees, however, assimilated with the local society 
over the long term, and thus formed a social stratum in the province that could be best 
characterized by its constant restlessness.12 
Second general remark. By the final third of the nineteenth century, the social 
changes that had reached the Balkans had transformed or abolished the majority of the 
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 Adolf Strauss, Großbulgarien (Posen–Leipzig–Warshau–Budapest: Mitteleuropäischer Buch- und 
Lehrmittelverlag, 1917), 52-60. There were 15,000 chiflik owners and only 10,000 freeholders in the region. 
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 Osmanli Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti (Istanbul: T.C. Başbakanlik. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 
2007), BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 1/99. 332-334. 
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 Konrad Clewing, “Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo – ein geschichtlicher Überblick,” in Der 
Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen-Akteure-Verlauf, eds. Konrad Clewing and Edvin Pezo (München: Bayerische 
Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit, 2000), 46-47; Karl Kaser, “Raum und Besiedlung” in Südosteuropa. 
Ein Handbuch, eds. Margaditsch Hatschikjan and Stefan Troebst (München: Beck, 1999), 53–72; and Jens Oliver 
Schmitt, Kosovo. Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft (Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau, 2008), 79-
84, 153-56. 
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formerly existing identity patterns. This world was in transition in a religious, social and 
economic sense as well. The identity of the local, South Slavic-speaking Eastern Orthodox 
peasantry was also in crisis, though it was not the recognition of Christians as equal citizens 
that challenged this identity. This occurrence took place too late, as it almost coincided with 
the birth of modern nationalistic ideas in the neighboring small states—and as mentioned 
earlier, equal citizenship did not represent a real alternative, since neither Muslims nor 
Christians were satisfied with the reforms.13 The arrival of nationalism created new fault 
lines within the population, such as religion had earlier, but without erasing the old 
differences. The several types and layers of identities were overlapping one another, 
creating chaos in minds, rivalry between the political ideologies (loyal-liberal and 
nationalistic-revolutionary) and an upsurge in social change, which was exploited by national 
movements. The latter current was more popular, partly because it offered a solution to 
social inequalities as demonstrated in IMRO’s response to the land hunger of peasants. 
Furthermore, in the present case,14 not only religious and nationalistic divisions tended to 
face one another at the same time,15 but in addition to the collision of competing internal 
ideologies, an external threat also manifested itself as a transmitter of the nationalistic idea, 
which offered a real alternative (a smallholder society with private property) for the 
oppressed. 
While in the Ottoman Empire opportunity for an essentially sectarian identity to 
develop and transform into something new (the “Ottoman nation”) arose at a rather slow 
pace, the numerous and elaborated national ideologies suddenly seemed to “flood” the local 
population. And soon enough, a violent rivalry broke out among the representatives of the 
different South Slav national creeds.16 These ideologies were no longer (or not only) 
promoted or propagated by the national church subjected to/or allies of the Ottoman state, 
but by patriot foreigners from the nation states built on a secular society or by the local 
intelligentsia, resulting as well in a multiplication of agents and ideologies, which presented 
average people with a difficult choice.17  
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 In contrast to Bulgaria, where economic prosperity grew together with the replacement of Spahis (as layers 
that were not cost effective) and resulted in the economic emergence of the Bulgarian smallholder in the 
1850s, in Macedonia the peasants remained economically deprived under Muslim landlords with no hope for 
prosperity after 1873–1878, when U.S. and Russian crops invaded western markets, thereby decreasing prices. 
It was the crop boom of the 1840s (thus an external source) that prolonged the existence of the Ottoman 
Empire, not the reforms themselves. These reforms did not create economically favorable conditions (it was 
only a successful response to existing opportunities), but to the contrary: the tax reforms of Midhat Pasha 
providing a surplus for the central government could be carried out due to the favorable economic situation. 
This was absent in the 1870s, when the Empire continued its reforms and deeply contributed to the failure of 
social modernization. Demeter Gábor, A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom I [The Balkan and the Ottoman Empire 
I] (Budapest: MTA BTK TTI, 2014). 
14
 The same thing had also taken place in France (1789–1815) and Central Europe (1848-49), leading to violence 
there as well. 
15
 In Europe the religious opposition preceded the occurrence of the latter by centuries and religious wars 
fought then were violent as well. 
16
 Schmitt, Kosovo, 160–67. 
17
 We use the model of Oliver Jens Schmitt, who drew a distinction between traditional and ethnicized identity 
patterns. The Macedonian case (the ethnicization of South Slavs) is similar to the Kosovo case. During the first 
phase the Orthodox millet undergoes a nationalization process, therefore a new “Slavic” identity is created to 
oppose the Greek Church. Within the Millet so-called “Konfessionsnationen”—confessional nations—were 
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evolving.  (After the abolition of the Patriarchate in Ipek [Peć], the goal of the Greek Patriarchate to uniformize 
the population failed with the exception of Vlachs mainly because this kind of assimilation could rely only on 
the urban Greek population, which simply did not exist in either Macedonia or Kosovo after the numerous 
Albanian raids in southern Macedonia in the 1820s that broke up the “Greek” Orthodox merchant 
communities.) The problem is that the fragmentation of the Christian Millet did not stop, because not only one 
center was created: the ethnicization/nationalization of religious identity took place not in contrast to the 
Muslim community, but within the Christian community. Based on its territorial autonomy, the Serbian identity 
was rather nationalized-secularized, while the Bulgarian identity (established in the Church) was national-
religious. In the second stage, a civilian élite was formed that questioned the leadership of the priests, finally 
overthrowing the latter. Third stage: the neighboring Eastern Orthodox small states interfere in this process by 
sending teachers and priests to influence the target groups.  
Although the religious identity was completely dissolved by the new, evolving ethnic identity, ethnicized 
identity patterns remained quite fluid among Eastern Orthodox South Slavs. Even in 1903 in the Sanjak of 
Prizren 17,000 Eastern Orthodox Exarchists (Bulgarians?) and 22,000 Patriarchists lived together: half of the 
Slavs in Kosovo were still not Serbian or Serbianized. Had Bulgaria started its nation-Church building 30 years 
earlier, the present Slavic population in Kosovo would be Bulgarian. According to Schmitt, this type of 
ethnicization reached only five percent of the population. In 1865, only 150 students studied Serbian in Peć: 
thus a narrow, but resolute and devoted national élite was formed. While the nationalization of this élite seems 
to be obvious, Schmitt did not find any evidence that the same process took place among the peasantry by the 
year 1900. Prior to the establishment of schools for the illiterate masses, the Church was the only institution 
that could transmit national(istic) ideologies. Therefore the role of the school system and the verbal 
transmission of ideologies through the Church is evident, like the mobilizing effect of promising land to the 
landless. Schmitt, Kosovo, 159–72.  
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Map. 1. Kaza-level religious and ethnic map of the Sanjak of Skopje by Zsolt Bottlik 
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II. The Background of Tensions and the Social and Spatial Patterns of 
Violence  
 
 
Nationality and denominational-sectarian conflicts claimed the most victims in Skopje Sanjak 
in the period from 1903 to 1908. The conflict can be classified into three major groups, two 
of which are under investigation in this study. The first type of religious conflict is 
represented by the rivalry between Patriarchists and Exarchists beginning in the 1870s.18 
Since the Skopje Sanjak was a collision zone of interests (spornata zona, contested zone) 
located between Serbia and Bulgaria, this phenomenon is not unique, although the 
proportion of Patriarchists did not exceed 10 percent compared to the 50 percent of 
Exarchists. However, these tensions were not limited to this region—the same phenomena 
occured in the Vilayet of Bitola (Monastir), Shkodra (Iškodra) and Saloniki (Selanik). This is 
demonstrated by the case of the Eastern Orthodox secondary grammar school in Prizren at 
the turn of the century; the Bogoslovie conflict that led the to cancellation of several school 
years as the result of constant  fighting between pro-Bulgarian and pro-Serbian factions and 
during which the reciprocal murder of Serboman and Bulgarian Orthodox priests continued 
until the arrival of a “neutral” clergyman sympathizing with Austria-Hungary; as well as some 
cases in the series of Karadag incidents from 1907 (see below).19 Atrocities over debated 
symbolic places usually dominated in the first phases of these conflicts, followed by struggles 
against symbolic personalities and culminating in the fight against the local population. 
 From a sectarian aspect, the Muslim-Christian conflicts (second type) proved to be 
the most serious among the peasantry in Kosovo Vilayet. A typical source of conflict was the 
Muslim raids on Christian churches, the perpetrators of which were hardly ever captured by 
Ottoman law-enforcement forces. The latter often encouraged such attacks in order to 
punish Cheta (četa) groups, but it had greater impact on the civilian population than on 
paramilitary groups. A good example of this type of attack is a February 12, 1907 Muslim 
Albanian raid in which Eastern Orthodox churches in the villages of Zubovce, Požaranje and 
Galata near Gostivar were ransacked and burned down. These villages were maintained 
jointly by the Serbian and Bulgarian religious communities of Gostivar, where the 
denominational identity was still stronger, than national identity. However, the delinquents 
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 This conflict was not only religious in nature as the Exarchate served the nation-building aspirations of 
Bulgaria. The Exarchate was quite popular among the South Slav peasantry, partly due to the cheaper 
education system and partly due to the language of liturgy (which could serve nationalistic goals, i.e., 
mentioning the name of Bulgarian rulers during the liturgy instead of Serbians or Muslims, as was the case with 
regard to the Varnava affair late in 1913, when Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria was mentioned in a village under 
Serbian occupation). Compared to this, the Greek Patriarchate was more popular in urbanized areas and 
among literate communities, which tended to pay a higher price to acquire knowledge, thus promoting the 
emergence of their social class. 
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 ÖHHStA PA, XXXVIII/ Kt.399. Prizren (1899–1900). Accounts on similar conflicts can be read in the 
dissertation of Frantz, “Zwischen Gewalt,” 161–178. and Bernard Lory, “Schools for the Destruction of Society: 
School Propaganda in Bitola, 1860–1912,” in Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans, 45–63. For the role of Church 
see Katrin Bozeva-Abazi, The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian National Identities 1800–1900 (Skopje: Institute 
for National History, 2007), 143–92.     
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were known to be Muslim Albanians originating from surrounding villages, the authorities 
did nothing in spite of the fact that even foreign consuls were voicing protest to the Grand 
Vizier.20 We must also stress that this sectarian dividing line was not identical to dividing 
lines between nationalities: for example, in Shkodra Vilayet (today west Kosovo), the Muslim 
Albanians launched attacks on the shrines of the local Christian Albanians as well.21 
The third type of religious conflict took place between Muslim communities (Bektaşi-
Sunni; rural-urban; citizen-official). Our statistical analysis will stress that conflict of this type 
was not negligible in the Skopje Sanjak. The three types of conflict often appeared together 
in the same area: sometimes their motives can be traced back to sectarian differences, 
sometimes to customs law, though they can also be attributed to economic, social or 
personal antagonism and were often encouraged by foreign pressure. 
The Skopska Crna Gora (Karadag) Mountains, located north of Skopje, represented 
one of the major hotspots of nationalistic tension beginning in 1907 (the same was true for 
the kazas of Kriva Palanka, Kočani and Radovište), as this was the zone in which Albanian, 
Serbian and Bulgarian interests collided and overlapped. (Serbian refugees from Stara Srbija 
had settled here in numerous villages between 1689 and 1739, and these refugees were not 
obedient to the Bulgarian Exarchate). Conflict broke out following a number of unrelated 
murders. One of the killing sprees was provoked by Serbians when they attacked an 
Albanian village led by Voivode Petko Ilić. Another incident took place in the village of 
Brodec: during a raid Bulgarian attackers killed two Serbian men and kidnapped seven more 
whom were never found. The motives remained unknown in both cases. In addition to the 
constant Bulgarian and Serbian propaganda and the activity of infiltrating irregular foreign 
troops, the situation was exacerbated further by the fact that the peasants of Skopska Crna 
Gora lived in traditional communities in which unwritten customs of the family blood feud 
entailed obligations on family members. The two series of events infuriated the local 
communities, which wished to avenge the dead. A few months later everybody was fighting 
with one another. In this case, the local conflicts stemmed from the consequences of local 
customs over which state law had seemingly no authority whatsoever,22 while the presence 
of foreign influence complicated the situation even further. Authorities did nothing, 
although the local people had asked not only them, but the consulates of the Great Powers 
to intervene as well. The subsequent peace negotiations were led by an Archimandrite from 
a local monastery named Sava, who unsuccessfully tried to make peace based on unwritten 
customs instead of official law. Although his efforts were thwarted by the local Albanians, 
who did not wish to give besa for the peace, his activity clearly illustrates that local people 
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 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, February 12, 1907, No.14/pol. (Beilage No. 131.res 
Rappaport to Oppenheimer,  8). 
21
 Ibid. For similar conflicts see: Natalie Clayer, “The Dimension of Confessionalization in the Ottoman Balkans 
at the time of Nationalisms,” in Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans, 89–109. 
22
 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, July 27, 1907, No.55/pol, 17 and October 29, 1907, 
No.71/pol, 14. 
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did not trust the official Ottoman administrators and that local customs were much more 
authoritative than imperial law.23  
Problems occurred not only at the Ottoman-Serbian border, but by 1907 along the 
Bulgarian frontier zone as well. Here the local traditions were exacerbated by the 
propaganda and paramilitary activity of small states. The equality of citizens meant nothing 
in these periphery areas where local communities and identities were still stronger than the 
imperial identity that attempted to secure/impose civil rights. These traditional communities 
became more susceptible to nationalism if it occurred together with the defense of local 
interests and traditions. The Bulgarian consul in Skopje enumerated in a notebook more than 
750 cases of violence committed by Serbs and Greek bands in 1906–1907. The list starts with 
the activity of Georgi Kapitan, who crossed the border with his Serbian Cheta and captured 
six hostages in two raids, then returned to Skopska Crna Gora, which served as his 
hinterland.24 It was a perfect base of operations: while promoting Serbian objectives, at the 
same time Kapitan could also avenge the previously cited atrocities committed against his 
host community. Local aspirations and state priorities intertwined, and those taken captive 
could never be sure whether they were being held for ransom to promote the Serbian cause 
or would be victims of blood feud.  
Even more interesting, two more Serbian Chetas were reported from the region of 
Kratovo and Štip in January 1907 in spite of the bad weather conditions and the fact that the 
location was far away from the Skopska Gora borderland. (The bands often operated far 
away from their hideouts in distant kazas to hinder the activity of authorities). These attacks 
were of different character: in February, Ivan Stajkov kidnapped the starešinas (chiefs, 
elders) of Stariprad village and forced the village to declare its loyalty to Serbia by taking up 
Serbian identity.25 These acts were definitely not connected to any vengeful act. 
 These changes in national consciousness were not permanent or irreversible: in 
many cases villages changed their identity quickly, if another Cheta appeared. Even religious 
and national categories were often mixed within a village. The intruders usually inquired 
about the nationality of residents (Serb, Bulgarian, Greek), though priests answered 
according to religious category (Exarchist, Patriachist), which did not satisfy the intruders.26 
The timing of the above-mentioned raids has more significance than the acts themselves: 
these events took place in winter, and cannot be explained by simple banditry, the goal of 
                                                 
23
 For information about the Lebenswelt of mountains and plains, including social norms corresponding to 
geographical attributes and constraints, see Frantz, “Zwischen Gewalt,” 63–79. and Eva Anne Frantz, “Soziale 
Lebenswelten im spätosmanischen Kosovo, 1870–1913. Zur Bedeutung von Berg und Ebene, Ökologie und 
Klima,” in Studime për nder të Rexhep Ismajlit me rastin e 65-vjetorit të lindjes, ed. Bardh Rugova (Prishtinë: 
KOHA, 2012), 261-73, esp. 262. 
24
 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 396. 
25
 Ibid. The Bulgarian consul was not alone in his collecting of data. The lack of public security due to the 
significant decrease in Ottoman power by 1903 prompted Austro-Hungarian consuls to start keeping statistics 
on violent activities in their own districts as well. 
26
 The same is true with regard to the appearance of the band of Livanios, D. Stavropoulo. See “Conquering the 
Souls: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia 1904–1908,” Byzantine and Modern 
Greek Studies 23 (1999): 204 and 210–11. See also Balogh Ádám, A nacionalizmus szerepe a görög politikai 
gondolkodásban [The role of nationalism in the Greek political thinking] (Szeged: SZTE, 2006).  
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which was to collect food and other means of subsistence. Since the villagers stayed in their 
dwellings during winter, an attack on them was riskier during this period than during the 
summer, when potential victims were working in the fields. Therefore the previously 
mentioned Cheta groups can be regarded as well-trained, organized and determined units in 
comparison to a simple band of robbers without deep-rooted nationalistic commitments.27  
Thus at least three different motives of Cheta activities can be discerned: their aims 
could be social (local revenge), economic (self-sustainment or weakening the economic basis 
of the enemy) or political (promoting national propaganda). Political results could also be 
achieved through the former two motives. Very often the frequency of the raids showed 
yearly fluctuation. During spring, the exhausted raw core of Chetas gained strength and 
supplies in the villages of target areas, and by wandering from village to village (partly for 
security reasons, partly in order to gather men for their cause), increased their number to 
between 20 and 40 men. Todor Alexandrov commanded a band of this type in Kratovo kaza 
in 1910.28 The peak of their activity was the late summer, when villagers collected the 
harvest far from their relatively secure dwellings. Winter attacks were quite rare: local 
people referred to snow as the “white police,” which was more efficient than the Ottoman 
authorities or the international gendarmerie operated by the Great Powers between 1903–
1908.29 Increased winter activity can be regarded as a peculiarity of Chetas supported by 
small states, while their other feature is the relatively great number of Cheta-band members. 
For example, the Cheta of Ivan Stajkov consisted of 30 men in February,30 which means that 
it was more than the “bare core.” 
Based on the above mentioned, two general tendencies began to gain ground 
concerning the organizational basis of Chetas following the turn of the century. The first was 
that denominational (sectarian) and national categories were mixed and combined in all 
conceivable ways (similarly to the goals and motives explained earlier). The second was that 
at the same time a new social stratum emerged in the vilayet: being a Cheta member 
became a lifestyle. Its members were destitute and therefore radical men (regardless of their 
religion or nationality) who simply tried to profit from the chaos.31 Besides the irregular 
troops arriving from abroad, which were fighting to realize national ambitions, and local 
revolutionary forces (like IMRO), these mercenary bands32 also created their own armed 
                                                 
27
 In winter the food supply was scarce, which may have encouraged bands to undertake risky operations, 
though finding shelter and covering up tracks was also harder. Simple banditry was more abundant during the 
summer.  
28
 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, July 30, 1910., No.56/pol., 8. 
29
 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, February 5, 1911., No.6/pol., 12. 
30
 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 396. 
31
 The Greeks indeed organized their paramilitary units this way from 1904, hiring men (mercenaries in fact), 
often regardless of their nationality who were not devoted to the Greek national movement, but had 
knowledge of local conditions and therefore offered a higher rate of success or effectiveness.  
32
 Irregular troops were organized for a number of reasons. Troops fighting against Ottoman rule were the first 
to appear (up to the 1860s). They were followed by irregular armies organized on a sectarian basis: the 
Patriarchists and the Exarchists (1870s). After 1878, a third group emerged: they fought against the Ottoman 
Empire and for modern national goals, and in the Skopje Sanjak they were originally Serbs and Bulgarians. The 
latter split further after the 1890s, when war broke out between IMRO activists and Vrhovists in Macedonia. 
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corps and under the banner of national goals they essentially lived off the terrorized 
population, as they could be hired to intimidate and assassinate local leaders. These groups 
were often balancing between banditry, freedom fighting, terrorism, and sometimes even 
functioned as auxiliary forces of Ottoman authorities (when maintaining public order or 
leading punitive actions). At any rate, this had a long tradition in Balkan countries.33 Several 
photographs of these frequently multi-ethnic or religiously mixed bands can be found in the 
military archives of the Great Powers (Photo 1). These Cheta leaders could easily be 
convinced to change their allegiances. The same happened to Ivan/Jovan Babunski, former 
Bulgarian Cheta leader from village Martulica, considered to be a Serbian agent from 1907 
on, who tried to intimidate the dwellers of Kriva-Kruša (Veles) as described in a letter 
captured by the Bulgarian Lieutenant Colonel Nedkov in Skopje.34  
The social acceptance of the phenomenon (band activity) was not unequivocal. 
Balogh mentioned that by the end of the eighteenth century, ten percent of Christians (and 
one-third of young men) had been involved in such a movement at least once in their 
lifetime.35 This proportion was even higher in Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. IMRO had 35,000 supporters in 1906 in the Skopje Sanjak, constituting more than 
ten percent of the Ottoman administrative unit’s population. Considering that IMRO was an 
organization that relied mostly on Exarchists (promoting Macedo-Bulgarian or Bulgarian 
interests),36 one cannot avoid the assumption that all Exarchist households were conscripted 
as sympathizers of the IMRO (Table 2): this is the only reason that could explain the high 
ratio of supporters of IMRO compared to Exarchist families37 (25 percent on average, each 
head of family). However, supporting the IMRO was still a better choice than to fall victim to 
a hired band (without genuine political commitment).  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that these men were activists, able and willing to 
fight at any time, but rather that they were used as messengers or that their infrastructure 
(animals, storage places) was exploited by activists. Furthermore, those who were 
conscripted (even if they remained passive toward the cause) had to pay the “revolutionary 
tax.” This—in addition to the official tithe that at that time was around 12–15 percent—
represented a further additional burden, paid willingly or under coercion.38 This financial 
                                                                                                                                                        
After 1878 “nationalist” Albanian paramilitary units also appeared in Kosovo Vilayet in addition to mercenary 
troops and bashibazouks. 
33
 The Hajdut and Klepht movement which has been active in the Balkans for centuries also had impact on the 
survival and persistence of these “traditional” forms of violent behavior. See Balogh, A nacionalizmus,  16. 
34
 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 259. л. 109–110. 
35
 See: Balogh, A nacionalizmus,  16. 
36
 The IMRO officially considered Macedonia to be an indivisible territory and claimed all of its inhabitants to be 
Macedonian regardless of their religion or ethnicity. In practice, most of their followers were Bulgarians. 
Basically it opposed foreign propaganda according to its statute of 1902 prior to Ilinden as well as after it in 
1906. Cindy C. Combs and Martin W. Slann, Encyclopedia of terrorism (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), 
135. 
37
 Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Vol. 2, Reform, Revolution, and 
Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 209. 
38
 ÖHHStA, PA, XXXVIII. Konsulate (1848–1918). Kt. 430. Üsküb (1900), Nr. 212. Pára an Goluchowski, 
handgeschrieben, Üsküb, September 17, 1900, Statut und Reglement der bulgaro-macedonischen Comités (ins 
Deutsche übersetzt) ( 3 +  14. Beilage, getippt): Cap. XI: Materielle Mittel der Comités “Auferlegte Hilfsbeiträge 
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resource, though important, was not the sole source of income for the IMRO. Beyond this, 
foreign support and regular economic activities (see later) were regarded a major sources of 
revenue as well.  
One must conclude that these people were considered primarily to be a taxable 
population rather than real fighters (and their willingness to fight may be also questioned), 
because according to a report from 1906, the 6,000 IMRO supporters in the Skopje kaza 
possessed only 250 rifles (including 190 old Berdans) with 17,000 cartridges and 85 revolvers 
with 1,550 bullets (Table 2).39  Generally only one-tenth of the supporters had rifles, and the 
highest ratio was measured in Kočani and Štip (11–13 percent). Here the ammunition-to-
weapon ratio was over 100 (explaining the escalation of violence in 1911–1912) and the 
ratio of older weapons was extremely high. We may assume that older weapons from the 
Crimean War were stored at home by peasants due to the deterioration in public security,40 
while Mannlichers and revolvers had been distributed among active members through 
smuggling.  
  
Photo 1. An example of hiring people of different ethnic background for the national cause: the 
ethnically and religiously mixed Chetas of the Serbian First Lieutenant Gutriković in Kaza Kumanovo 
1908:  
                                                                                                                                                        
werden zur Einschüchterung oder mit Gewalt von Personen abverlangt, die wohl helfen können aber nicht 
wollen.”  
“Art. 47. Zur Deckung der nöthigen Comité-Auslagen, jedoch hauptsächlich zur Bewaffnung der Arbeiter 
erhalten die Comités die Mittel 1/ aus den monatlichen Beitragleistungen der Mitglieder, die ihnen im 
Verhältnisse zu ihrer materiellen Lage bemessen werden; 2/ aus Opfern, die entweder freiwillig oder auferlegt 
sind. Anmerkung: Freiwillig sind diejenigen Unterstützungen, die sowohl von den Mitgliedern als auch von 
Personen gegeben werden, die sich nicht entschlossen haben, Arbeiter zu werden, jedoch mit der ’Arbeit’ 
sympathisieren, dieselbe zu fördern wünschen und zu diesem Zwecke gewisse Summe geben…” 
39
 Биярски, Цочо and Ива Бурилкова, eds., Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация. 
(1893-1919). Документи на централните ръководни органи, Vol. 1. Архивите говорят, 45. (Sofia: 
Universitetsko Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2007), 608–609. Nr. 209. 
40
 Although the number of weapons stored at home was large, this does not indicate a greater probability of 
everyday violence. The number of violent acts committed by non-Cheta members was very low in Kočani, 
though high in Štip.  
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Source and copyright: Kriegsarchiv (Wien) AOK-Evidenzbureau, Kt. 3483.
41
 
 
Table 2. The forces of IMRO and the ethnic distribution of the population in 1906 
 
Skopje Kumanovo Egri Palanka Kratovo Kočani Štip Veles Total 
All members 6,000 3,448 5,280 5,536 4,640 5,028 5,200 35, 132 
In Towns 2,500 0 210 156 320 2,381 0 5,567 
IMRO Supporters 
as Percentage of 
Total Population 
8.3% 7.6% 22% 25% 12% 11% 10% 12% 
IMRO Supporters 
among Exarchists 25% 15% 25% 32% 25% 25% 18% 24% 
Rifles (Mannlicher 
and Berdan, Gras) 250 140 311 208 300 345 440 1,994 
Old Rifles from 
the Crimean War 9 28 0 107 200 293 20 657 
Pistols 85 40 37 26 42 44 35 309 
Bullets 17,300 4,570 22,660 45,000 56,000 55, 000 48,650 249,180 
Bullets 1,550 313 1,710 800 1,700 1,760 1,050 8,883 
Bullet / Weapon 67 27 73 143 112 86 106 94 
Weapons  to 
Supporters in 
Percentage 
4.32 4.87 5.89 5.69 10.78 12.69 8.85 7.55 
Bombs, Dynamite 122 15 60 125 58 36 0 416 
Bulgarian Villages no data 1 no data 63 56 50 50 over 220 
                                                 
41
 Published by the permission of Kriegsarchiv of Vienna. 
16 
 
Serbian Villages 11 23 8 1 0 0 8 51 
Turkish Villages 20 54 0 2 16 70 40 202 
Mixed S-4, T-9 0 S-3 T-5 
 
T-7 S-2 S-9, T-21 
Ethnic Character Bulgarian-Muslim 
Turkish-
Serbian Bulgarian Bulgarian Bulgarian-Turkish 
Turkish-
Bulgarian 
Bulgarian-
Muslim  
Dominant 
Character of 
Violence in 1905 
Muslim 
against 
Christian 
Muslim 
against 
Christian 
Low Case 
Number 
Christian 
against 
Christian 
Unknown Muslim-Christian 
Muslim 
against 
Muslim; 
Muslim 
against 
Christian 
 
Income 500 436 250 574 500 770 1,500 4,530 
Data calculated from: Биярски, Цочо and Ива Бурилкова, eds., Вътрешната македоно-одринска 
революционна организация. (1893–1919). Документи на централните ръководни органи. Vol. 
1. Архивите говорят, 45 (Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2007), 608–609. Nr. 
209. 
 
Kidnapping, ransom, mass theft of animals, blackmail, threatening letters, the 
disinterest of Ottoman authorities and bribery, as Ikonomov enumerated the methods in 
1911, forced many villages to convert (often temporarily) to a new identity.42 The village of 
Kanarevo (Kumanovo kaza) decided to become Serboman after the starešina was 
threatened and bribed.43 Bulgarian priests were arrested in Krastev Dol and in Radibuš by 
Ottoman authorities, and soon Serbian priests arrived to replace them.44 Ruginci, Orah and 
Podarži Kon became Serboman due to violence committed by Bulgarian Chetas.45 In some 
cases the conversion of a village was not a sudden act—it took years and the two parties 
often continued to live together: this kind of coexistence happened in the case of Stačna, 
Teovo, Oreše, etc. (Very often social or economic tensions within the community were the 
explanation for the situation). Nevertheless this phenomenon could also serve as a source of 
recurrent violence. In other cases, settlements changed sides many times: this happened 
with particular frequency after 1908, the reestablishment of the constitution and the 
disarmament of Chetas: see the case of Oreše, Izvor, Rankovski, etc., which became 
Bulgarian settlements after Serbia temporarily lost Ottoman support, then changed sides 
again by 1910, when Serbian propaganda became revitalized again (Table 3).46  
 
Table 3. Settlements accepting the authority of Patriarchate between 1889–1908 
 
Never 
Exarchist 
Became Serboman between 
1889–1903  Became Serboman between 1903–1908 
Became Bulgarian 
again after 1908 
Skopska Kaza 
Banjani*, 
Gornjani*, 
Čučer*, 
Brovec*, 
Kučevišta*,  
Kučkovo* 
Raženičino, Pakoshevo, Novo 
Selo, Gorno Orizari, 
Vizbegovo, Vučedol, Dolno 
Slivari 
Tavor (12), Pobože (15+60)  
                                                 
42
 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 205. л. 112-125. 
43
 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 396. л. 5-7. 
44
 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 205. л. 112-125. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
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Veleška Kaza 
 
Rudnik  (45+10**), Bašino 
selo (34+150), Bogomila, 
Orahovdol (32+58), 
Kapinovo (14), Mokreni (64), 
Nežilovo (30+38), Teovo 
(50+60), Gabrovnik (12+19), 
Omorani (96+17), Lisiče 
(19+58) 
Vladilovci (75+2), Smilovci (36), Oreše 
(73+29), Pomenovo (45), Starigrad (43), 
Novoselo (28+15), Izvor (44+16), 
Martinci (39), Stepanci (60), Nikoladin 
(46+83), 
Oreše, Izvor, 
Nežilovo, 
Novoselo, 
Smilovci, 
Pomenovo, 
Vladilovci, 
Orahovdol 
Kratovska 
Kaza  
Šalkovica (13), Šopsko 
Rudari (20+75), Kratovo 
town (340+550 Muslim) 
?  
Kumanovska 
Kaza 
Staro 
Nagorično* 
(130 was never 
exarchist of the 
145), 
Dumanovci (34+6), Četirci 
(62) 
Karlovci (15), Koinci (25), Vragoturci 
(42), Maložino (60), Ramno (67), 
Arbanaško (42), Dlbočina (40), Dejlovci 
(62), Žegnjane (50), Stepanci (45), 
Kokino (50), Bajlovci (114), Osiče (15), 
Ženovino (33), Alinci (48), Breško (12), 
Svilanci (24), Kanarevo (46), Drenak 
(82), Orah (85), Ruginci (65), Bukovljani 
(24), Čelopek (62+15), Dobrača (12+6), 
Strezovci (40+13), Janinci*, Pelinci*, 
Beljakovci (52+21), Kučkarevo (10) 
 
Palanečka 
Kaza  Stačna (20+12) 
Carcorija (75), Dobrovnica (55), Lukje 
(140), Ogut (125), Podarži kon (116), 
Metirevo (55), Osiče (50), Baštevo (33), 
Gaber (102), Dlbočnica (69), Petrilica 
(305), Ljubinci (24), Radibuš (127), 
Stečna (32), Gulinci (45), Opošnica (90), 
Krivi kamen (27), Rankovci (135), 
Vražogranci (15), Ginovci (75), Milutinci 
(72) 
Ginovci, Radibuš, 
Milutinci, Osiče, 
Krastov dol, Lukje 
(100+40), Ogut, 
Baštevo***, 
Carcarija***, 
Dobrovnica***, 
Dlbočnica***, 
Gaber (14+88), 
Rankovci 
Tetovska Kaza 
 
Brezno, Rogačevo, Staro 
Selo, Vratnica ? Dolna Lešnica 
Gostivarsko 
Kaza  Zubovci (50+50), 
Balil dol (30+50 Muslim), Dobreše 
(40+110 Muslim), Vrutok (24+45), 
Pečkovo (17+15), Leunovo (79+38+16 
Muslim), Mavrovo (121+31), Nikiforovo 
(77), Železni Rečani 
 
Kočanska 
Kaza   
Nivičane (60+8), Gradče (32), Leški (21), 
Pašadžik (12), Pantalej (14+28) 
Nivičina, Gradče, 
Leški, Pašadžik 
* Never Exarchist, mostly refugees from Stara Srbija between 1689–1739 in the so-called Skopska Crnagora.  
**The first number in brackets represents Patriarchist households, the second Exarchist. Muslims are usually indicated. 
*** Patriarchist Bulgarian villages.                                       ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 205. л. 112-125. 
 
Location of Serbian Cheta leaders in 1907 (approximately 170 men) 
Skopska 
Černogoria Nikola Janković, Angelko Slavković +10 men 
Veles Ivan Martulčanec (Azot) + 10 men, Dušan (Orahovdol) + 10 men 
Egri Palanka Georgi Skopjanče(to) (Kozjak Mts.) + 10 men, Spas Garda (Petralica) 
Kumanovo Jovo Kapitan, Denko Genin, Pop Dičo vojvoda 
Kočana 
Turkish-Serbian mixed Cheta led by the Serbian teacher from Kočani with the approval of the 
kaymakam 
Skopje Petko Kapitan (Staro Nagoričano) 
Porečie, 
Kičevo, Azot 
Grigor from Nebregovo with 30 men, Stefan with 10 men, Ivan Dolgač(ot) with 15 men, Pavle 
from Bač (Albania) with 7-8 men around Dibra 
Prilep Ivan/Jovan Babunski and 15 men, Boško vojvoda from Vir with 10 men 
СайкоТрифонов, Величко Георгиев, eds., История на българите в документи, Vol. I/2. 1878–
1912 (Sofia: Просвета, 1996), 290-91. 
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The instruments cited above served not only to promote forced Serbianzation or 
Bulgarization of the villages, but provided food and income for the Cheta as well to sustain 
their activity as these units were often operating far away from their hinterland. The 
identification of Serboman villages in kazas distant from the Serbian border may indicate  
areas of local support for Serbian Chetas (Table 3).  
Beyond taxation, pillaging and “requisition,” another source of income came from 
state subsidies: the Bulgarian consulate in Skopje warned the government that Serbian 
agents received 300,000 dinars for the Serbianization of the vicinity of Kratovo (this amount 
is equal to the annual salary of 350 teachers or 150 military lieutenants). These agents had 
bought weapons (one witness, a major of the international gendarmerie, mentions 200 
rapid-fire guns) instead of creating schools, buying land or bribing local leaders, and only a 
small sum was spent on securing the loyalty of local people.47 The small states with claims to 
this territory recognized quite quickly that the destruction of existing (infra)structures was 
more cost-effective and its effect was more permanent than establishing churches, schools 
and buying land; therefore beginning in 1908 (following the withdrawal of the Great Powers 
and their failure to stabilize the situation and after the radicalization of Young Turks) there 
was a radical shift from soft methods to hard methods.48 This transformation clearly 
indicates the beginning of the third phase of the Macedonian question, which was 
characterized by nearly unlimited violence and coercion.  
 The violent activity of infiltrating irregular foreign troops increased the high mortality 
rate (caused by local tradition) even further. Due to the escalation of violence, both the 
IMRO and former Vrhovists49 organized meetings where they - at least verbally - pointed out 
that peasants should be kept away from the violence and should not be considered as target 
groups. These agreements were not only driven by social sensitivity, but by economic 
rationale as well. Since land revenue constituted a significant proportion of the income of 
IMRO, it was in the fundamental interest of the organization to secure the safety of peasants 
living in areas under its control to promote the cultivation of lands. Through the use of its 
armed forces, IMRO compelled peasants to work the land and often prescribed what to grow 
on the fields. Surprisingly, this coercive agriculture was economically rational in a certain 
sense as the IMRO favored crops with greater added value than that of the wheat 
traditionally grown in the region. One hectare of land sown with poppy seed resulted 
between 10 and 15 kilograms of opium (if the plantation was not set on fire by rivals) with 
an average price of 25 to 30 francs per kilogram, thus producing total revenue of between 
300 and 450 francs per hectare. This significantly exceeded the revenue derived from other 
crops (one ton of wheat was about 130–150 francs and the average yield did not exceed one 
                                                 
47
 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 396. л. 5-7.  
48
 By the end of 1908, the Greek Cheta organizer, Colonel Danglis, acquired 10,000 guns with one million 
rounds of ammunition, and more than 50 Greek military officers worked legally in Macedonia after 
relinquishing their ranks, while the Bulgarians had already distributed more than 30,000 weapons. See, Balogh, 
A nacionalizmus,  88. 
49
 The left wing of IMRO officially supported autonomy, while the right wing (Vrhovists) fought for the 
unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria. 
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ton per hectare, while the ratio of harvested wheat was only 5 to 1).50 By monopolizing trade 
in opium and tobacco, IMRO was able to create self-sustaining Chetas that were wedged 
between peasant and trader expropriating the profits. Since this was a risky enterprise as 
both adversaries and the government tried to hinder this activity, the mobility of Chetas 
decreased when they had to defend the harvest. Economic oppression and permanent 
migration generated by political tension led to desertion of arable lands. By 1912 only 
400,000 hectares of land was under cultivation in Kosovo Vilayet out of the total 3.2 million 
acres as a result of the growing violence.51 
Although an armistice between the two organizations (IMRO and Vrhovists) was 
desirable, efforts to conclude such a truce were more or less futile,52 partly as a result of the 
growing activity of Muslim bands prior to 1908. The latter attacked not only local peasantry, 
but also launched attacks against the gendarmerie led by international officers. This special 
form of violence was carried out not against the officers themselves, but against local 
Christians serving as privates in the gendarmerie in order to discourage them from 
participation in police forces.53 Nevertheless, this category is not included in the term 
“everyday violence” used by the authors.  
 Not only the armed corps, but the propaganda and ideologies promoted by the 
neighboring states also battled with one another in the region even during the relatively 
peaceful period prior to the Ilinden Uprising.54 The target groups (and propagators) of these 
ideologies were primarily Eastern Orthodox priests and village teachers,55 who – based on 
their functions within the community – were able to disseminate this message most 
efficiently. The peasantry was targeted directly to a lesser extent owing to its illiteracy. The 
greatest influence shaping the identity of villagers was undoubtedly exercised by the priest 
and the teacher: the village usually followed the national identity pattern(s) that they 
represented or were forced to represent.56 
The fight for supremacy evidently required organizational infrastructure beyond 
human capital: apart from schools and churches that were considered outposts of the state, 
which were immobile, though able to control the “Raum und Boden” and were thus most 
exposed to physical attacks, a network of background institutions responsible for securing 
optimal conditions was also created.57 The Bulgarian state refrained from directly imposing 
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 The total opium harvest in Skopje Sanjak reached 100,000 kg., generating revenue of up to 2.5–3.0 million 
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 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Calice, August 12, 1906., No.75/pol., 4. (Komitadschis Congress in 
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 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Pára to Calice, August 15, 1902. No.92/res, 3. 
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 One of the methods included ethnic mapping by Belić, Gopčević and Cvijić on the Serbian side. By this time 
ethnic mapping had definitely become a political instrument that was often very distant from reality.  
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 When conquering Macedonia in 1913, Serbs imprisoned nine out of ten teachers. История на македонскиот 
народ. Vol 4., (Skoplje: INI, 2000),  73. 
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 Bozeva-Abazi, The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian National Identities, 41–88. and 120–23. 
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success: a strong middle class, craftsmen and merchants serving as donators for the new ideology, and the 
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its own agents on Macedonian Bulgars: the influence of the Bulgarian state over school 
affairs prior to the Ilinden Uprising was realized through Macedonian-born Slavic teachers 
educated in Bulgaria (who were influenced by Bulgarian propaganda). This strategy could 
enhance confidence of local society towards the Bulgarian state, while the Bulgarophile 
Macedonians were able to (re)create their own intelligentsia. Out of a total of 1,239 
professors and teachers in the Bulgarian schools of Macedonia in 1902, 1,220 were native 
Macedonians and, in addition to the 15 Bulgarian-born Bulgars teaching in Macedonia, there 
were 450 Macedonian Bulgars teaching in the schools of liberated Bulgaria.58 The numbers 
also reflect the great role of the Macedonian-born population in Bulgarian political life.59  
The dynamic increase of Serbian schools between 1896 and 1901 is the product of 
the following factors: despite the existence of the supporting organizational background, the 
Serbian presence was relatively insignificant in Macedonia prior to 1903; however, Serbian 
propaganda was increasing (with support from Ottoman authorities) compared to Bulgarian 
propaganda. This phenomenon provided a warning to the Bulgarians, and between 1901 and 
1910 the number of teachers in Bulgarian schools almost doubled, which also reflects 
changes in the support policy in comparison to that previously mentioned. 
 
Table 4. The result of “peaceful” propaganda: schools in Macedonia in 1896 / 1901 / 1910 
 Schools Teachers Students 
Bulgarian 843 / 785 / 1359 1,306 / 1,220 / 
2,203 
43,432 / 40,000 / 78,519 
Serbian   77 / 178 /  118 / 321/   2,873 / 7,200 / 
Greek      / 924/         / 1,400 /            / 57,500 /  
Jacob Gould Schurman, The Balkan Wars: 1912–1913 (London: Humphrey Milford, 1914) see: 
www.gutenberg.org/etext/11676 1914. and D. Misheff, The truth about Macedonia (Berne: Pochon-Jent, 1917) 
see also: http://www.promacedonia.org/en/pdf/mischeff_the_truth_about_macedonia_1917.pdf 
 
Even after the involvement of the Great Powers, the provinces were still crying for 
relief.60 Between May 1904 and May 1905, 111 violent cases committed by Chetas were 
                                                                                                                                                        
institutionalization of ideology through the contribution of the state. Apart from schools—the first Serbian 
school was established in Prizren in 1836 to challenge Greek cultural domination—this included: the 
establishment of the Serb cultural commission in Belgrade in 1868 in order to hinder the Islamization of Eastern 
Orthodox people; availability of state stipends in Serbia; the foundation of Družstvo Svetog Save in 1886 to 
coordinate cultural activities that could not be undertaken by the Church; the foundation of seminary for 
priests in Prizren in 1871, thus the state took over tasks from the Church. The Serbian state opened the 
consulate in Prishtina by 1889. The main goal of this consulate was to spread national propaganda; another aim 
was to disseminate unfavorable stereotypes about Albanians in order to inhibit rapprochement between local 
Slav and Albanian communities. Although Serbian scholars had already written their idealistic-ideological works 
and disseminated them both locally and in the West by the time Bulgaria became independent, these works 
focused mainly on Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus the redirection of aims and instruments toward Macedonia 
required time. Schmitt, Kosovo, 160–65.  
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reported within the boundaries of Macedonia by a Bulgarian source, including those 
targeting authorities (these should not be included in the term “everyday violence,” but can 
be compared to them). This means that these atrocities claimed an average of seven victims. 
This high number reveals that these incidents and conflicts were not accidental or of 
personal character, but were planned in advance as a part of a campaign of intimidation and 
revenge symbolizing a special type of warfare. This source does not reveal whether the 
proximity to borders or distance from central administration had an effect on the escalation 
of violence (while in the case of Austro-Hungarian consular reports, such an investigation 
could be carried out), nor does it provide an account of the interethnic character of conflict, 
contrary to the Austro-Hungarian consular reports.  
Based on the above mentioned report of Shopov, most of those arrested in 
Macedonia were Bulgarians (80 percent, a result of either the activity of Bulgarians or the 
prejudice of authorities, because their ratio within the population did not exceed 60%), 
though almost two-thirds of them were found not guilty. Among those who were convicted, 
Bulgarians were not overrepresented: 20 percent of arrested Bulgarians were sentenced to 
several years in prison: this represents 79 percent of all imprisoned, while Bulgarians 
constituted 80 percent of those arrested. The ratio of imprisoned Serbs was also around 20 
percent in comparison to the number of Serbs arrested. Among the acquitted, Serbs were 
overrepresented (80 percent of arrested Serbs were freed), while the investigation process 
was the longest in case of Greeks due to the fact that they were often not Ottoman but 
Greek citizens,61 contrary to Bulgar(ian)s, who were mainly recruited from the territory of 
Macedonia and not from Bulgaria.  
According to the data collected by Shopov, Greek Chetas preferred to capture people 
alive and hold them for ransom, which means that the Greek struggle for Macedonia was in 
its initial phase: 70 percent of captured were held by Greeks, while the proportion of 
atrocities committed by Greek forces was only 27 percent. This practice was quite rare in 
case of Serb and Bulgar offenders: 66 percent of those who died were killed by Bulgarian 
Chetas, although the latter were involved “only” in 50 percent of encounters. The ratio of 
murders committed by Serbs/Bulgars was 80 percent among the victims of 
Serbian/Bulgarian violence. Compared to this, murders constituted only 33 percent of Greek 
violence. The proportion of the victims of Ottoman authorities constituted “only” 17 to 20 
percent of all victims and those who died among them were underrepresented (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Distribution of violent acts between ethnic groups in 1905 thoughout Macedonia according 
to Shopov 
Arrested Convicted Acquitted 
Still under 
Investigation 
Ethnic Group 
1,607 (80%) 313 (20%) 993 (62%) 301 (18%) Bulgarian 
349 (17%) 79 (22%) 99 (28%) 171 (50%) Greek 
                                                 
61
 Only 87 out of the 255 known Greek Chetniks were Greek subjects, while another 21 arrived from Crete in 
1905. ЦДА, ф. 332k. oп. 1. a.e. 17. л. 544–555. 
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52 (3%) 4 (8%) 41 (80%) 7 (13%) Serb 
2,008 (100%) 396 (20%) 1,133 (55%) 479 (25%) Total 
Confrontations Wounded Killed Captured Alive Adversary 
68 (61%) 6 320 (81%) 65 (16%) 
Bulgarian Chetas 
 (total cases: 391) 
30 (27%) 12 93 (33%) 165 (61%) 
Greek Chetas 
(total cases: 270) 
13 (12%) 2 96 (86%) 13 (11%) 
Serbian Chetas 
 (total cases: 111) 
111 
 (average of seven 
people per 
confrontation) 
20 509 (66%) 243 (31%) Total: 772 
? 122 86 - 
Committed by Turkish 
Authorities 
ЦДА, ф. 332k. oп. 1. a.e. 17. л. 544-555. 
 
But the most convincing evidence of the failure of the Ottoman authorities and the 
international intervention to maintain public order and of the increasing anarchy that 
ensued after the turn of the century are the detailed statistics compiled by Austro-Hungarian 
consuls listing the victims of the social conflicts. These are conflicts (contrary to those 
discussed above) that cannot be tied unambiguously to the activity of Chetas or authorities, 
thus falling under the category of “everyday violence.” A typical example of consular reports 
is the document written in Skopje in 1905 enumerating all acts of everyday violence that 
occurred in the sanjak between May 11 and September 13 of that year.62  
 
Table 6. List of violent activities in Radovište kaza (cited in the original language): officially five 
political murders were recorded among the 20 cases, but only one victim was a committee member
63
 
 
11. Mai Fatima und Tochter Zarifa aus 
Treskavec 
Getötet, Täter unbekannt 
27. Mai Koce aus Podoreš Vermißt 
16. Juni Demendezi aus Jargerica getötet, Täter angeblich Comité-Rache 
17. Juni Stojan aus Jargerica getötet, Täter angeblich Comité-Rache 
19. Juni Avram Jane dessen Frau und Tochter 
aus Rozbunar 
verwundet, Täter 3 unbekannte 
Mohammedaner 
20. Juni Risto Konstantin aus Radovište verwundet, dtto 
20. Juni Traman Dimitrija aus Delina schwer verwundet, Täter angeblich Türken 
28. Juni Kristo Ile aus Vratica der Tatverdächtig der Mohammedaner 
Damjan [sic!] 
12. Juli Jovan Velko aus Šipkovica Vermißt 
16. Juli Angelko Trajan, Jordan Postol, Mike 
Lazar, Mike, Petre Stojan, Tase 
Gjorgje: Hirten aus Radoviste 
von einer mohammedanischen Bande 
gefesselt und durch Messerstiche getötet 
17. Juli Stojan Niko u. Gam: dtto dtto. 
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19. Juli Trajce Zafir aus Kance getötet, Täter Rara Ahmed 
12. August Dane Jane und Sohn David, Koce Ilia 
aus Vrahovica 
getötet, Täter mohammed. Comités 
18. August Tašo Georgiev aus Radovište getötet, Täter unbekannte Comités 
21. August Ilija und Arif aus Vrahovica  getötet, Täter 3 Mohammedaner 
25. August 1 unbekanntes Comité-Mitglied bei 
Gmerdeš 
Getötet 
3. September File Risto aus Jargaica getötet, Täter unbekannt 
3. September Todor Spasov aus Kanče getötet, Täter Türken aus Promet 
3. September  Panče Ilo aus Skoruša getötet, Täter Türken aus Promet 
Im Kaza Radovište: Getötet 23, Verwundet 4, vermißt 2, 
 
Dated from 1905 this list enumerating 285 victims in a period of four months from a 
smaller area looks to be more detailed compared to the report of Shopov containing 772 
victims in a period of one year throughout Macedonia. Cases were reported for each kaza 
giving the name and religion of perpetrators and victims (see Table 6), which makes the list 
more valuable and informative than Shopov’s report. Note that the cases enumerated here 
took place after the intervention of the Great Powers (Mürzsteg, 1903), therefore it also 
demonstrates the powerlessness of the recently organized international gendarmerie. This 
list provides the possibility of tracing certain phenomena and to observe certain tendencies 
(the spatial pattern of violence, the role of border areas, the correlation between the 
ethnicity and religion of perpetrators and victims, etc.), though the cause of conflicts still 
remain obscure. Although the names of the victims and the perpetrators do not provide 
unquestionable evidence of their nationality, the sectarian composition may be more or less 
precisely reconstructed, thus permitting an investigation of religious or ethnic tensions.64  
But this did not represent the peak of violence by any means. After the failure of 
international intervention, the number of people killed increased quickly: in 1908 a total of 
1,080 “political murders” were committed throughout Macedonia (while in 1905, the 
number of all victims of Chetas—including all types: dead, injured and missing—was only 
772), claiming among its victims 649 Bulgarians, 185 Greeks, 130 Muslims, 39 Serbs, 36 
Vlachs and 40 soldiers according to the report of the Englishman Harry Lamb.65 Compared to 
their proportion of the entire population, Muslim victims seem to be underrepresented and 
Bulgarian victims a bit overrepresented. The reinstatement of the constitution in 1908 
proved to be more effective than any other earlier measures: over the last five months of 
that very year, only 71 political murders took place, constituting seven percent of all 
murders, while during the first four months of the year it almost reached 50 percent.66 One 
cannot avoid the assumption that the armistice among bands in 1908–1909 as a 
consequence of the rise to power of the Young Turks contributed to the stabilization of the 
situation to a greater degree than the constitution and the parliamentary elections, events 
that rarely entail immediate results. 
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Comparing the Bulgarian and the Austro-Hungarian sources one may arrive to the 
following conclusions: first, that violent acts committed by Chetas became more frequent 
between 1905 and 1908 in Macedonia (772 killed and injured compared to 1,080 killed); 
second, that Austro-Hungarian documents are more detailed and therefore more suitable 
for conducting further analysis; and three, that everyday violence (or acts not reported as 
political murders) was apparently as frequent as political violence. (Just to compare the two 
types of violence: during the first four months of 1908, 450 people were killed by Chetas 
throughout Macedonia, while in the first four months of 1905, 197 people were killed in 
everyday violence within the much smaller area of the examined sanjak).  
In some places of the Sanjak of Skopje in 1905, the average number of victims per 
attack exceeded four or five (like in the Bulgarian statistics with Cheta involvement, where 
seven victims per attack were counted), which makes it evident that in these cases not 
simply personal antagonism or economic conflict, but rather ideological or intergroup 
tensions represented the source of violence. The names and occupations in Table 6 reveal 
that many of the victims (especially the four women) can hardly be identified as members of 
paramilitary units (their activity may have been confined to providing information or 
supplying troops) and that in many cases they were victims of blood feuds motivated by 
rivalry between communities or were victims of punitive actions or intimation on the part of 
Chetas. Based on the high average number of victims per attack, the Bulgarian source 
focuses much more on the activity of Chetas, emphasizing the paramilitary-revolutionary 
character of the violent acts, while the Austro-Hungarian report enumerates single cases as 
well, when perpetrators were not Cheta members, though their actions fit into the category 
of  everyday violence.67  
The fearless early usage of coercion and violence against civilians and activists as well 
is clearly confirmed by a document called “Reglement für die Bulgarisch-Adrianopeler 
Revolutionären Comités”68 dating from the year 1900. These revolutionary committees had 
their internal secret police as well, which was divided into two branches. The duty of the first 
branch, the investigative police, was not only to observe foreigners, non-Cheta members 
and government officials, but to examine the deeds and actions of Cheta members as well. 
The second branch was called the executive secret service, the task of which was not only to 
support the leaders in case of internal crisis, but also to punish activities reported by the 
observers. The revolvers mentioned in the document summarizing the resources of the 
IMRO from 1906 were used by this branch of secret police. In addition to the spies and 
Ottoman bureaucrats who impeded the activity of revolutionaries, not only activists, but 
even members of the civil population were allowed to kill regardless of their ethnicity if they 
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threatened the goals of the committees and disregarded the first warnings and fines. This 
punishment was extended to Bulgarians living either in Bulgaria or abroad if they engaged in 
activity serving to exacerbate discontent among revolutionaries. Even those were sanctioned 
who had acted under pressure, were forced to commit violence or were tortured by enemies 
of the committee. Mentioning the name of a committee member to the authorities or in 
public for the second time also entailed a death sentence.69 These punitive measures could 
also have been in the background of the escalation of everyday violence, as very often the 
community did not know of killings or did not dare inform authorities of them. (It is also not 
surprising that communist activists and ideologists visiting the Balkans and were well 
acquainted with the Macedonian cause, like Trotsky, implemented these methods effectively 
in organizing secret police in their homeland. Even the terms used, such as “Arbeit”, 
reappear in these documents).  
Neither the high concentration of IMRO weapons nor the ethnic heterogeneity of 
districts always resulted in the escalation of violent activities. The activity of IMRO cannot 
alone explain all forms of “everyday violence:” in Kočani, which was well-supplied with 
ammunition, everyday violence was rare, although here Albanians and Muslims also lived 
together with Bulgarians. The extent of violence was also relatively low in Veles, although 
IMRO had plenty of bullets and weapons and half of the district was Turkish. In Kriva Palanka 
and in Kratovo, the high ratio of victims measured to the total population (Table 7) at first 
glance seems to be due to the fact that an extremely high 22 percent of the population 
supported the IMRO (Table 2). However, the percentage of sympathizers supplied with 
weapons was quite low here (five percent). Furthermore, both territories were mainly 
Exarchist in character, therefore neither interethnic tensions nor the clashes with the Turkish 
authorities can explain the spread of violence here (these conflict types are excluded from 
the term “everyday violence.”)70  
 
Table 7. Types of violent activity and the territorial and religious distribution of victims in Skopje 
Sanjak between May 11 and September 13, 1905
71
 
 
Kaza Attacks Killed Injured Missing 
Christian 
victims 
Muslim 
victims 
Unknown Total 
Victims per 
1,000 
Inhabitants 
 
Skopje 
8 
(average 
of 5 
killed) 
41 8 2 30 (2 f) 
19 (4 f, 1 
c) 
3 (1 f) 52 (7 f, 1 c) 0.71 
Kumanovo 9 36 9 4 21 (1 f) 12 16 49 (1 f) 1.07 
Kriva 
Palanka 
24 24 9 5 15 (4 f) - 24 38 1.55 
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Kratovo 13 13 5 4 9 3 10 22 0.97 
Kočani 3 3 1 1 4 1 - 5 0.13 
Maleš 3 3 5 2 3 2 5 10 0.37 
Radovište 23 23 4 2 25 (2 f) 3 (2 f) 1 29 1.57 
Štip 
11 
(average 
of 4 
killed) 
42 11 10 44 13 (1 f) 6 63 1.37 
Veles 12 12 1 5 8 5 5 18 0.33 
Total 106 197 53 35 159 (9 f) 
58 (7 f, 1 
c) 
70 (1 f) 
287 (17 f 1 
c) 
0.82 
f = females; c = children  
 
Table 8. The religious and territorial distribution of perpetrators committing crime between  May 11 
and September 13, 1905 (only known perpetrators included)
 72
  
Kaza 
Christians Christians 
Altogether 
Muslims Muslims 
Altogether 
Unknown 
Cases Total Against 
Christians 
Against 
Muslims 
Against 
Christians 
Against 
Muslims 
Skopje 5 3 8 8 3 11 26 45 
Kumanovo 3 2 5 10 3 13 12 30 
Kriva 
Palanka 2 - 2 1 - 1 7 10 
Kratovo 4 - 4 - - 1 9 + 173 14 
Radovište 2 1 3 9 1 10 6 19 
Štip 6 1 7 13 1 14 29 50 
Veles 2 1 3 2 3 5 3 11 
Total 27 (14%) 7 (4%) 34 43 (22%) 11 (6%) 55 101 (53%) 189 
 
As the authors pointed out earlier, the Austrian source offers possibilities for deeper 
investigation (cases committed by soldiers or police are not included!). Most of the victims 
(including deaths, injuries and missing) were Christian (55 percent) (Table 7–8). The 
proportion of Muslims was 20 percent, while 25 percent remained unknown. Compared to 
their proportion of the entire population of the sanjak (40 percent), Muslim victims were 
somewhat underrepresented (Table 1). With regard to the perpetrators, these ratios are not 
more than estimates, as more than 50 percent of cases remained unresolved. This 
demonstrates the low effectiveness of imperial and international authorities. Based on 
known cases, Muslims mainly attacked Christians (22 percent of the total, four times more 
frequent than Muslim attacks on Muslims), while the proportion of Christian perpetrators 
committing violent crime against Muslims was only four percent of the total (Table 8). 
Attacks within the Muslim community ranged up to six percent of the total, while violence 
between Christians constituted more than 14 percent of the total in Skopje Sanjak (this was 
a greater percentage value than that of Christian crimes against Muslims!). One may arrive 
to the conclusion that the Exarchist-Patriarchist rivalry was more important here (compared 
to the relatively small ratio of Patriarchists in the territory) than the hostility of Christians 
towards Muslims and that violence within the Muslim community was more frequent than 
violence toward other communities.  
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The spatial pattern of violence can be investigated too: in Štip kaza Christians 
primarily attacked Christians, while Muslims in Štip, Kumanovo and in Radovište mainly 
attacked Christians. These phenomena were not connected to ethnic predominance: in 
Kumanovo, Muslims composed only 30 percent of the population, while in Štip they 
constituted the majority. In the vicinity of Kriva Palanka and Kratovo,74 all known Christian 
attacks were targeted against other Christian communities. This may be explained by the 
fact that though these kazas were ethnically homogenous, the national conflict between 
Bulgars and Serboman troops was fierce (one should not forget that 50 percent of cases 
were unresolved, therefore the numbers have limited statistical relevance). The spatial 
distribution of victims and perpetrators (Table 9–10) shows that the largest absolute 
numbers of victims were located in Skopje, Štip and Kumanovo kazas. Nevertheless, these 
absolute numbers are not representative, as these kazas had larger populations. The 
proportion of victims measured against the total population is more representative. With 
this in mind, victims of violent activities were overrepresented in Kumanovo, Kriva Palanka, 
Kratovo, and especially in Radovište and Štip kazas. These territorial units were located in 
the mountainous periphery far away from the administrative center and from the Vardar-
axis (which was serving as the main connection route to adjacent areas). 
 
Table 9. The proportion of perpetrators and victims compared to the population in the sanjak 
(considered as 100 percent) in 1905 (in order to examine underrepresentation and 
overrepresentation)
 75
 
 
Skopje Kumanovo Kriva Palanka  Kratovo Radovište 
Štip Veles 
(Ištib) (Köprülü) 
Population (%) 21 13 7 6 5 13 15 
Victims (%) 18 17 13 8 10 22 6 
Perpetrators (%) 24 16 5 7 10 26 6 
Kočani and Maleš were omitted due to small case number. 
 
Table 10. Spatial and religious differences of violence in 1905 based on the comparison of victims 
and perpetrators. Colored background indicates overrepresentation (>1) 
Kaza 
Christian 
Victims/ 
Christian 
Population 
Muslim 
Victims/ 
Muslim 
Population 
Christian 
Perpetrators/ 
Christian 
Population 
Muslim 
Perpetrators/ 
Muslim 
Population 
Distance 
from 
Center76 
Distance 
from 
State 
Border 
Skopje 1.35 0.69 0.41 0.46 1 2 
Kumanovo 0.61 0.89 0.24 1.58 2 2 
Radovište 2.09 0.18 0.38 0.93 4 3 
Štip 1.65 0.37 0.33 0.50 3 4 
Veles 0,70 0.78 0.43 1.28 2 5 
*Kriva Palanka and Kratovo was omitted due to the large proportion of unknown delinquents, Kočani 
and Maleš was omitted due to small case numbers 
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The same conclusions can be made with regard to the data on perpetrators. Measured 
against the entire population, perpetrators were overrepresented in Skopje, Radovište and 
Štip, nearly the same kazas in which the ratio of victims compared to population was the 
largest. In the latter two kazas, the proportion of perpetrators and victims was twice as high 
as the proportion of the population of the kaza compared to the total population of Skopje 
Sanjak (Table 9). This is not surprising, since based on the conscription of 1903 the 
proportion of Muslims was quite high in these places (see the map of Kančov or the map 
published in Carnegie Report).77 Based on the absolute numbers of perpetrators and victims, 
these attacks were the bloodiest, reaching an average of between four and five deaths per 
attack. Christian victims measured against Christian population were overrepresented in 
Skopje, Radovište and Štip kazas, but it did not mean that Christian victims78 were killed 
solely by Muslims (see Table 8 and 10), while Muslim perpetrators compared to Muslim 
population were overrepresented in Kumanovo, Radovište and Veles. Muslim victims and 
Christian perpetrators were not overrepresented anywhere. 
 
Table 11. Correlation table between variables related to violence in 1905 (only those who are known 
to have committed crimes are included) 
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Christian 
Victims* -0.75 
Proportion of Muslim Perpetrators vs. 
Distance from Administrative Center -0.47 
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Christian 
Perpetrators* 0.41 
Percentage of Unknown Cases vs. Distance 
from Administrative Center 0.36 
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Muslim 
Victims* -0.42 
Percentage of Unknown Cases vs. Distance 
from Border -0.55 
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Muslim 
Criminals* -0.31 
 Proportion of Muslim Criminals vs. 
Distance from Borders 0.55 
Percentage of Christian Victims vs. Percentage of 
Christians Perpetrators -0.78 
Proportion of Muslim Victims vs. Distance 
from Borders 0.40 
Proportion of Muslim Victims vs. Proportion of Muslim 
Perpetrators 0.33 
Percentage of Muslim Victims vs. 
Distance from Center -0.76 
Percentage of Christian Victims vs Proportion of 
Muslim Perpetrators 0.29 
Percentage of Muslim Perpetrators vs. 
Percentage of Christian Perpetrators 0.19 
*Substituting Christians with Muslims, the strength of correlation does not change. Significant 
relations are marked in bold letters. 
  
Contrary to some well-distinguished territorial patterns, violence in the sanjak (as a 
total) was characterized mainly by weak correlations, thus general features are 
overshadowed by local patterns. Although significant, but reversed correlation was 
measured between the proportion of Christian victims and the proportion of Christian 
perpetrators (k= -0,78),79 other relations did not show such strong correlation due to the 
previously mentioned ethnic heterogeneity and due to the diversity of conflict types 
enumerated earlier (Table 11).80  
                                                 
77
 Among the interior kazas Skopje, Radovište and Štip had Muslim majorities (52.8–56.6 percent), while in 
Kumanovo and Veles Christians constituted the majority (63.4–70.3 percent). 
78
 Most of the victims here were also Christians.  
79
 Meaning that if the proportion of Christian perpertators is great, the proportion of Christian  victims is low, 
and where the proportion of Christian victims is great, the proportion of Christian perpetrators is low. 
80
 The correlation coefficient between the Christian population (percentage) and Christian perpetrators is also 
high, though remained under 0.5. Clashes between Christians elevated this number, while Christian-Muslim 
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Since perpetrators were mainly Muslims both in kazas with a Muslim majority (Štip) 
and with a Muslim minority (Veles), while victims were Christians, the pattern of violence at 
the kaza level was not determined solely by the religious character of the population, but by 
other factors (distance from borders, violence among those of the same religion). Violence in 
central territories was relatively rare (even despite the higher population density), while it 
was more frequent in peripheral kazas along the Bulgarian and Serbian borders. We may 
assume that Christian perpetrators were overrepresented along the Bulgarian border and in 
Slavic-speaking territories, while Muslim perpetrators were more frequent in the Kumanovo, 
Veles and Radovište kazas along the Muslim-dominated Vardar-axis. As the distance 
measured from the centers grew, the proportion of Muslim perpetrators decreased (r= -0.8). 
The clearance rate also draws attention: a general tendency is that police were the most 
inefficient along the easily penetrable Bulgarian border. Unresolved cases ranged from 60 
percent (Maleš) up to 100 percent (Kočani!) in the peripheries.81 Spatial differences 
regarding violence and driving factors were collected to summarize our analysis in Table 12.  
 
Table 12. Summary table: characteristics of wave of violence in 1905, Sanjak of Skopje (May 11–
September 13, 1905) 
 
Skopje Kumanovo Kriva Palanka Kratovo Kočani 
Maleš 
(Osmanie) Radovište Štip Veles 
Distant from Center (x),  
Near Borders (y) 
 
y xy xy xy xy x x 
 
Proportion of Unresolved Cases is 
Significant x 
 
x x x x 
 
x 
 
Proportion of Muslim Population is 
Significant xx 
   
xx x xx xx x 
Proportion of Victims Compared to 
Population is Significant 
 
x x 
   
x x 
 
Proportion of Perpetrators 
Compared to Population is 
Significant 
x 
     
x x 
 
Muslim-Christian Conflict x x 
    
x x 
 Christian-Christian Conflict x x 
 
x 
   
x 
 Muslim-Muslim Conflict x x 
      
x 
Majority of Known Perpetrators is 
Muslim 
 
x 
    
x x x 
Majority of Known Perpetrators is 
Christian 
   
x 
     
Christian Victims Are 
Overrepresented x 
     
x x 
 
Muslim Victims Are 
Overrepresented 
 
x 
       
 
                                                                                                                                                        
clashes tended to decrease it. The value of the coefficient demonstrates that conflict of both types was 
abundant in the area. There is no close relation between the proportion of Muslim victims and Christian 
perpetrators or between Muslim victims and Muslim perpetrators on sanjak-level as a result of the same 
factors, since conflicts may occur in the Muslim-Muslim relation as well as the Muslim-Christian relation.  
81
 While in the case of Kumanovo, Radovište and Veles this was only between 27.2–40.1 percent.  
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Map. 2. Kaza level map of the religious distribution of victims and perpetrators in the Sanjak 
of Skopje by Zsolt Bottlik 
 
Conclusions 
Summarizing that mentioned above we can draw the following conclusions:   
• the borders between the different types of violent actions triggered either by 
sectarian and school conflicts or by customs law gradually faded; 
• the supporting policy of small states shifted irreversibly from construction to 
destruction;  
• the activity of the irregular troops was limited only by the change of seasons 
(neither Ottoman authorities nor the withdrawal of support could stop them any 
longer);  
• chetas became highly organized and self-subsistent groups through involvement 
in agriculture (opium, tobacco, smuggling) or expropriation of state and private 
properties; 
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• loyalty to the state also faded: in addition to troops pursuing nationalist ideas, 
ethnically and religiously mixed mercenary bands also existed and were hired;  
• the representatives of the state did not even attempt to address the economic 
and political problems. Their violent and intolerant interference, despite the 
temporary successes, hastened the escalation of conflict into anarchy;  
• the “usual” social conflicts (between public officers and citizens, security forces 
and inhabitants, etc.) also became uncontrollable,82 and became overshadowed 
by the new types of conflict; the practices of Chetas were adopted by other 
violent (state and guerilla) organizations; 
• the nationalistic movements declared total warfare in which, compared to the 
years prior to 1903, not only were the Ottoman administration or military forces 
and the active members of the movements (ideologists, like teachers and priests) 
regarded as targets, but the passive masses as well, as they could provide shelter, 
information, ammunition and an economic base for rivals; 
• the economy had collapsed by 1912, fields remained uncultivated due to the 
wave of violence, which triggered emigration. 
 
On the eve of the First Balkan War there was no functioning state administration and 
economy in the Sanjak of Skopje, which had turned into a frontier zone. 
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